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In re Impounded: When Will the Right Against Self-
Incrimination Protect Witnesses from Foreign 
Prosecution? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Though many think that their constitutional rights are inviolate, 
the Supreme Court has held in at least one case that certain rights do 
not apply to United States citizens on United States soil. In 1998, 
the Supreme Court decided that a man who immigrated to the 
United States nearly forty years ago should have no constitutional 
protection under the Fifth Amendment right to silence because he 
did not face criminal prosecution in this country. Because he could 
not invoke his right to silence, the man was required to testify about 
his activities during World War II in an extradition hearing. Should 
the constitutionally guaranteed right against self-incrimination pro-
tect United States citizens from foreign prosecution? In United 
States v. Balsys,1 the Supreme Court concluded that it should not. 
While some people applaud the Balsys decision for its application to 
seventy- and eighty-year-old suspected (but not convicted) Nazi war 
criminals,2 the decision also applies to ordinary American citizens. 
Because of the Balsys decision, federal or state governments can force 
any citizen to provide testimony in a United States court that could 
be used against him or her in a foreign jurisdiction. 
Statutes providing for immunity allow the government to force a 
witness to testify by promising that the government will not use a 
witness’s words against him or her in any future prosecution. Immu-
nity, however, only bans the government from using the witness’s 
testimony in criminal prosecution. Mr. Balsys faced the possibility, 
however, that his testimony, forced by a grant of immunity, could 
still be used against him in a foreign criminal prosecution. With the 
current trend toward increased cooperation between nations in law 
enforcement and criminal prosecution, knowingly allowing the use 
 
 1. 524 U.S. 666 (1998). 
 2. See generally Stacy Belisle, Note, United States v. Balsys: The United States Supreme 
Court Takes a Stand to Maintain the Fifth Amendment’s Integrity, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 
341 (2000). 
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of, or actively sharing, immunized witness testimony with foreign na-
tions who plan on prosecuting the witness in a criminal court makes 
a mockery of the Fifth Amendment. 
The likelihood of the Balsys decision remaining the final word on 
this issue is very slim. In a recent case, In re Impounded,3 immunized 
witnesses before a New Jersey grand jury claimed that the Balsys deci-
sion created a test for recognizing when the Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination could be invoked for fear of criminal prose-
cution in a foreign country. While the New Jersey court could im-
munize the witnesses from prosecution in the United States, grant-
ing such immunity would not have protected the witnesses from 
prosecution in a foreign country. The Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit held that Balsys did not create a test, or, even if Balsys did 
create a test, the witnesses did not prove all of the test’s necessary 
elements. While the facts underlying In re Impounded did not sup-
port the witnesses’ argument for an exception to Balsys, an exception 
should be found to protect witnesses who are forced to testify, have a 
real fear of foreign prosecution, and whose testimony is made avail-
able to foreign authorities as a result of actions by the United States 
government. The rights contained in the Constitution must be pro-
tected to guarantee the purposes for which they were given—to pro-
tect individuals from governmental abuses of power. 
This Note describes the Balsys exception test, examines the ele-
ments of the test to determine when the exception applies, and sug-
gests some refinements. Part II of this Note will examine the histori-
cal background that serves as a foundation to the Balsys decision, 
including early Supreme Court cases discussing the applicability of  
Fifth Amendment rights in state and federal courts. Part III will ex-
amine the Third Circuit decision in In re Impounded and the argu-
ments made by that court against the application of the Balsys excep-
tion. Part IV will argue that the Supreme Court did, in fact, create 
an exception to the general rule that witnesses fearing foreign prose-
cution cannot invoke Fifth Amendment privileges in its Balsys deci-
sion and will suggest the appropriate factors to be considered in fu-
ture attempts to invoke the Balsys exception. Finally, Part V will 
conclude that the witnesses in In re Impounded did not adequately 
demonstrate the factors required to invoke the Balsys exception; ho-
 
 3. 178 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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however, that “another day”4 will come when the facts will be ripe 
for the extension of constitutional protection to those who face for-
eign criminal prosecution. With increasing cooperation between for-
eign countries, how long will it take the Supreme Court to success-
fully apply the Balsys exception test? It is not a question of “if” but 
“when.” 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE BALSYS DECISION 
Less than a hundred years ago, the Supreme Court struggled to 
decide whether a person’s incriminating testimony given in a state 
court could be used as evidence to convict in a federal court. At first 
the Court determined that the Constitution could not prohibit the 
use of immunized testimony obtained in a state court from being 
used in a federal court.5 Thirty-two years later, however, the Court 
reversed its United States v. Murdock decision in Murphy v. Water-
front Commission.6 In Murphy, the Court held that the Fifth 
Amendment protects witnesses against the use of their self-
incriminating state court testimony in federal court. In the Balsys 
opinion, the Court reviewed Murdock and Murphy and found that 
the Murdock arguments, although overturned by Murphy, provided 
the logic necessary to justify its decision to force Mr. Balsys to testify, 
even though his words could, and probably would,7 be used against 
him in a foreign criminal prosecution. 
To show how the Supreme Court evolved between its Murdock 
and Balsys decisions, this section provides the background leading up 
to the various cases that guide the Court’s current self-incrimination 
jurisprudence. A brief introduction to the Self-Incrimination Clause 
and the statutory grant of immunity shows the tension between the 
rights of the people to protect themselves and the desire of the state 
to prosecute crime. Next, a discussion of the Murdock holding illus-
trates how the seed for the Balsys decision was planted. Third, be-
cause of changes in criminal prosecution techniques and the increas-
ing collusion between state and federal police forces, several cases 
 
 4. Balsys, 524 U.S. at 699. 
 5. See generally United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); Feldman v. United 
States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944); Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958). 
 6. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). 
 7. The government did not challenge the reasonableness of Balsys’ fear, which means 
the fear was probably justified. See Balsys, 524 U.S. at 672. 
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weakened Murdock and brought about the Murphy decision. Fourth, 
this section quickly reviews certain Supreme Court cases involving 
the fear of foreign prosecution that led to the Balsys decision. Finally, 
this section discusses the Balsys decision and examines the possible 
exception test language written by Justice Souter. 
A. Development of Fifth Amendment Jurisprudence: Self-
Incrimination and Immunity 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution con-
tains the Self-Incrimination Clause. This clause states that no person 
“shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self.”8 Until 1964, the Fifth Amendment could only protect a wit-
ness in federal court from being forced to give self-incriminating tes-
timony that could be used against him in a later federal prosecution.9 
Because prosecutors needed to elicit testimony from uncooperative 
witnesses, courts allowed grants of immunization. The Supreme 
Court has held that a prosecutor can choose whether to exchange 
immunity for the testimony, but, once immunity has been given the 
prosecution can compel or force the witness to give testimony de-
spite the witness’s objection.10 Because the government can compel a 
witness to testify by offering immunity, witnesses forced to testify in 
the United States can have that testimony used against them in a for-
eign jurisdiction. Despite this possibility, the Supreme Court has not 
allowed a witness to seek protection under the Fifth Amendment in 
these cases. Instead, the Balsys decision allows federal prosecutors to 
coerce witness testimony without taking into consideration the real 
consequences to the witness, leaving the witness no refuge from for-
eign prosecution. 
B. United States v. Murdock and the Self-Incrimination Clause 
In United States v. Murdock,11 the Supreme Court specifically 
held that a federal court could compel a witness to testify, even when 
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination has been in-
voked. The Supreme Court in Murdock faced the question of 
 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 9. See generally United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); Feldman v. United 
States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944); Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958). 
 10. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
 11. 284 U.S. 141 (1931). 
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whether a witness in federal court could invoke the Fifth Amend-
ment for fear of prosecution in a state court. Mr. Murdock was in-
dicted for refusing to answer questions posed to him by an agent of 
the Internal Revenue Bureau regarding deductions on his individual 
federal income tax returns for 1927 and 1928.12 Explaining his re-
fusal, Murdock claimed that the information requested “would have 
compelled him to become a witness against himself in violation of 
the Fifth Amendment,”13 incriminating himself under state law.14 
The Supreme Court determined that, since “the investigation was 
under federal law in respect of federal matters,” it should “not be 
prevented by matters depending upon state law.”15 In other words, a 
federal court could compel Murdock to testify even though that tes-
timony could later be used against him in a state criminal prosecu-
tion. 
Creating the distinction between federal and state matters, the 
Court relied upon “[t]he English rule of evidence against compul-
sory self-incrimination,”16 which the Court concluded “does not 
protect witnesses against disclosing offenses in violation of the laws 
of another country.”17 The Supreme Court cited several English 
cases18 as examples of the English rule that a witness could not refuse 
to testify for fear of foreign prosecution because the other jurisdic-
tion could not reach him. The Murdock Court argued that since fed-
 
 12. See id. at 146. 
 13. Id. at 147. 
 14. See id. at 148. In reality, Murdock’s testimony would have only subjected him to 
prosecution under federal law not state law, but, as the Court noted, “This court has held that 
immunity against state prosecution is not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring 
that a witness shall not be excused from giving evidence on the ground that it will incriminate 
him.” Id. at 149. In addition, the Court also noted that the Fifth Amendment does not pro-
tect a witness compelled to give testimony by a state statute who might face federal prosecu-
tion. “[T]he lack of state power to give witnesses protection against federal prosecution does 
not defeat a state immunity statute.” Id. 
 15. Id. at 149. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. King of the Two Sicilies v. Wilcox, 7 St. Tr. (N.S.) 1050, 61 Eng. Rep. 116 (V.C. 
1851) (holding that defendants could not resist discovery of information that might lead to 
prosecution under the laws of Sicily because it would be impossible, if such a precedent was 
created, to determine whether a particular case might subject a defendant to prosecution in a 
foreign country and because the witnesses would have to enter the jurisdiction of the foreign 
country to become subject to that prosecution); Queen v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311, 74 Rev. Rep. 
571 (1861) (holding that the witness’s fear of being impeached by Parliament was too un-
founded to warrant consideration). 
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eral and state courts have separate and distinct jurisdictions—like 
foreign countries—the possible repercussions in one should not ex-
cuse a witness from giving testimony in another. Therefore, a federal 
court could only grant immunity from prosecution in federal court 
and not from state prosecution. 
C. Changes Led to Murphy v. Waterfront Commission 
Though the Court intended Murdock to definitively address the 
issue, changing circumstances required a clarification of the scope of 
the holding. As better methods of communication and transporta-
tion developed during the first half of the twentieth century, the 
commission and also the prosecution of crimes adapted to these im-
proving technologies. It became much easier for criminals to flee 
from state to state or to commit crimes across states. As crime took 
on an interstate nature, state agencies began to work more closely 
with each other and with federal agencies to prosecute crimes. Collu-
sion between state and federal agencies made determining whether 
prosecutorial action was taken on behalf of state or federal officers 
more difficult. These changing prosecutorial methods led to the 
Court’s decision to overturn Murdock in Murphy. 
1. Some important cases leading up to Murphy 
As the challengers of the Murdock decision became more numer-
ous, the Supreme Court gradually eroded the foundation supporting 
its holding. In Feldman v. United States,19 the Court dealt with the 
issue of “whether the Fifth Amendment prohibited the admission 
against Feldman upon his trial in a federal court of the earlier testi-
mony given by him in the state courts.”20 Relying on Murdock, the 
Court held that “[t]he immunity from prosecution, like the privilege 
against testifying which it supplants, pertains to a prosecution in the 
same jurisdiction.”21 According to Justice Black’s dissent, the Court 
wanted to limit the Fifth Amendment “to the narrowest plausible 
limits.”22 Therefore, the majority found that, even though Mr. 
Feldman had received immunity for his testimony, immunity granted 
 
 19. 322 U.S. 487 (1944). 
 20. Id. at 489. 
 21. Id. at 493. 
 22. Id. at 496 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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by the state could not protect him from federal prosecution.23 Justice 
Black also noted in his dissent that “[a]ncient evils historically associ-
ated with the possession of unqualified power to impose criminal 
punishment on individuals have a dangerous habit of reappearing 
when tried safeguards are removed.”24 Unfortunately, Justice Black’s 
comment proved all too prophetic. 
Nearly a decade later, the Court’s resolution to uphold Murdock 
was again attacked. In Knapp v. Schweitzer,25 a New York grand jury 
witness was held in contempt of court for refusing to testify, despite 
an immunity grant, because he feared federal prosecution after learn-
ing that the local United States Attorney had announced an intent to 
cooperate with the state district attorney. The Court feared that 
Knapp’s challenge could “lead to the contention that when Congress 
enacts a statute carrying criminal sanctions it has as a practical matter 
withdrawn from the States their traditional power to investigate in 
aid of prosecuting conventional state crimes, some facts of which 
may be entangled in a federal offense.”26 As a result, the Court held 
that the Self-Incrimination Clause is “not . . . a general declaration 
of policy against compelling testimony.”27 However, the Court did 
mention that “[i]f a federal officer should be a party to the compul-
sion of testimony by state agencies, the protection of the Fifth 
Amendment would come into play.”28 As federal officers became 
more involved in the apprehension and prosecution of criminals by 
state officials, this passing mention became more important. 
In a situation involving the opposite application—where a state 
used the compelled testimony of a witness before a congressional 
committee—the Supreme Court took a different approach. Despite a 
federal statute protecting the witness’s testimony from use “in any 
criminal proceeding . . . in any court,”29 the state tried to argue that 
the statute had been waived or that it did not apply to state courts.30 
To this the Court responded, “[A] witness does not need any statute 
to protect him from the use of self-incriminating testimony he is 
 
 23. See id. 
 24. Id. at 502. 
 25. 357 U.S. 371 (1958). 
 26. Id. at 374–75. 
 27. Id. at 380. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1954) (repealed 1970). 
 30. See Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 180 (1954). 
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compelled to give over his objection. The Fifth Amendment takes 
care of that without a statute.”31 In a later case, the Court inter-
preted that statement to “suggest[] that any testimony elicited under 
threat of contempt by a government to whom the constitutional 
privilege against self-incrimination is applicable . . . may not constitu-
tionally be admitted into evidence against him in any criminal trial 
conducted by a government to whom the privilege is also applica-
ble.”32 As the later interpretation shows, this holding seriously un-
dermined the Murdock decision. 
2. The Murphy decision and incorporation of the Fifth Amendment 
Having allowed these decisions to undermine the Murdock hold-
ing’s reliance on the separate sovereignty of state and federal 
courts,33 the Supreme Court addressed the self-incrimination issues 
again in two major decisions decided on the same day. In Malloy v. 
Hogan,34 the Supreme Court finally held that the Self-Incrimination 
Clause applied to state actions by incorporation through the Four-
teenth Amendment.35 Reviewing a Connecticut court’s decision to 
hold a probationer in contempt for refusing to answer questions that 
might incriminate him under state law, the Court held that “the 
Fifth Amendment’s exception from compulsory self-incrimination is 
also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by 
the States.”36 This decision established a constitutional requirement 
 
 31. Id. at 181. 
 32. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 75–76 (1964). 
 33. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 34. 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 35. Prior to Malloy, several Supreme Court decisions determined that many rights con-
tained in the Bill of Rights applied to the states by incorporation through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. These cases include Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). These and other cases did not reflect a change in the under-
standing of the Fifth Amendment in particular but a change in the Supreme Court’s under-
standing of Due Process, the Fourteenth Amendment, and their application to state laws. 
Mapp v. Ohio required that states exclude evidence obtained through unreasonable searches 
and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See 367 U.S. at 655. Previous to this rul-
ing, the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the actions of state police 
officers. See id. at 654. In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court held that suspects in state 
court had an enforceable Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See 372 U.S. at 339. These and 
other decisions showed how the guarantees of the Bill of Rights could be incorporated 
through the Fourteenth Amendment to allow Congress to protect individuals against state ac-
tion. 
 36. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 6. 
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that “[g]overnments, state and federal, . . . establish guilt by evi-
dence independently and freely secured,”37 not by coerced self-
incriminating testimony.38 As a result of this holding, state prosecu-
tors could no longer use compelled testimony of any kind to prose-
cute a suspect because Fifth Amendment privileges protected all wit-
nesses in state courts. Now that the states had to abide by the Self-
Incrimination Clause, the Murdock decision needed another look. 
In the second case decided that same day, Murphy v. Waterfront 
Commission,39 the Supreme Court reversed its holding in Murdock. 
Even though they had been “granted immunity from prosecution 
under the laws of New Jersey and New York,”40 the petitioners in 
Murphy claimed that they would face prosecution in federal court if 
they answered questions put to them in a state court investigation.41 
The Court decided to review this case, in part, due to the develop-
ment of “‘cooperative federalism,’ where the Federal and State Gov-
ernments are waging a united front against many types of criminal 
activity.”42 The Supreme Court determined that the Murdock opin-
ion “did not adequately consider the relevant authorities,”43 particu-
larly the English cases describing the English rule against compulsory 
self-incrimination, and that, on review of these cases, subsequent 
scholarly developments showed the Court’s prior reasoning to be 
flawed.44 The relevant authorities used this time by the Supreme 
Court included two British cases decided prior to the ratification of 
the Constitution.45 Considering this new information, the Court 
recognized that the Murdock decision rested on a flawed understand-
ing of English precedent. “[T]here is no continuing legal vitality to, 
 
 37. Id. at 8. 
 38. See id. 
 39. 378 U.S. 52 (1964). 
 40. Id. at 53–54. 
 41. See id. 
 42. Id. at 56. 
 43. Id. at 57. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. at 58–59. In East India Co. v. Campbell, 1 Ves. Sen. 246, 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 
(Ex. 1749), the witness claimed that his testimony before an English court might subject him 
to punishment in India. The court allowed the protection of the privilege against self-
incrimination because compelling testimony would subject him to punishment of a crime in 
India. In the second British case, Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. Sen. 244, 28 Eng. Rep. 157 
(Ch. 1750), a woman feared that her answers would subject her to prosecution in ecclesiastical 
court. In this case, the court held that the general rule protects a person from incriminating 
himself even if the punishment would be under a different set of laws. 
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or historical justification for, the rule that one jurisdiction within our 
federal structure may compel a witness to give testimony which 
could be used to convict him of a crime in another jurisdiction.”46 By 
reviewing all the cases making up the English Rule and looking at a 
subsequent English case,47 the Supreme Court determined that 
Murdock had been incorrectly decided. Under its “new” understand-
ing of the English Rule, the Murphy Court ruled that a person testi-
fying in a state court, whose testimony could be used for prosecutory 
purposes in a federal jurisdiction, could invoke the Fifth Amendment 
since a person facing “a real danger of prosecution in a foreign coun-
try” could do the same.48 In reaching this decision, the Supreme 
Court thought it had settled all questions regarding immunity from 
prosecution and the Self-Incrimination Clause. However, it became 
apparent that the last word had yet to be said. 
D. The Supreme Court and Certain Foreign Prosecution Cases 
As a result of increasingly close relations with foreign nations, the 
question concerning the invocation of Fifth Amendment rights to 
protect a witness from compelled self-incrimination once again be-
came an issue. Prior to the Balsys decision, the Supreme Court had 
only heard two other cases concerning fear of foreign prosecution 
and the Fifth Amendment.49 One case was vacated and remanded 
with instructions to dismiss because the question was moot.50 As a 
 
 46. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 77. 
 47. The other new case was United States of America v. McRae, 3 L.R.-Ch. 79 (Ch. 
App. 1867), which held that a defendant in England could refuse to answer questions put to 
him because his answers would incriminate him under United States law. 
 48. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 67. 
 49. There is a case considered by the Supreme Court over one hundred years ago where 
a defendant’s words incriminated himself in prosecution in the United States after his confes-
sion was improperly obtained in Canada, a reversal of the Balsys and In re Impounded situa-
tions. In Bram v. United States, the Supreme Court determined that the confession elicited by 
a Canadian detective was improperly admitted as evidence because it was improperly obtained. 
See 168 U.S. 532, 565 (1897). The argument, however, did not focus on the foreign origin of 
the evidence. Instead, the Court determined that the statement was not voluntarily made ac-
cording to the Court’s contemporary, now discredited, understanding of the Fifth Amend-
ment. See id. Therefore, Bram cannot be used to support a proposition that the Supreme 
Court had given Fifth Amendment rights to witnesses facing foreign prosecution. See, e.g., Ste-
ven J. Winger, Note, Denying Fifth Amendment Protections to Witnesses Facing Foreign Prosecu-
tions: Self-Incrimination Discrimination?, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1095, 1099 
(1999). 
 50. See Parker v. United States, 397 U.S. 96 (1970). Parker was held in contempt of 
court for failing to provide immunized testimony before a grand jury. See In re Parker, 411 
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result, the Court never addressed the issue. In the other case, Zi-
carelli v. New Jersey State Commission of Investigation,51 the Court 
considered a witness’s refusal to testify in an organized crime investi-
gation for fear that his testimony could be used against him in prose-
cutions in Canada, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela.52 Be-
cause the Fifth Amendment only protects against “real dangers”53 
and because the defendant, according to the Court, did not face any 
real danger that his testimony would lead to foreign prosecution, the 
Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment privilege could not be in-
voked.54 The Court did note in closing that “[s]hould the Commis-
sion inquire into matters that might incriminate [the witness] under 
foreign law and pose a substantial risk of foreign prosecution . . . 
then a constitutional question will be squarely presented.”55 Though 
the decision went against the witness because there was no real 
threat of foreign prosecution, this statement clearly shows that the 
Court could conceive of a situation when a witness, facing a real risk 
of foreign prosecution, might properly invoke Fifth Amendment 
protection against self-incrimination. 
E. Balsys and the Self-Incrimination Clause: Supreme Court Addresses 
the Foreign Prosecution Issue 
By addressing the issue of foreign prosecution and the Fifth 
Amendment in Balsys, the Supreme Court attempted to end any con-
fusion concerning the constitutionality of compelling testimony from 
a witness facing the threat of foreign prosecution.56 Aloyzas Balsys 
entered the United States in 1961 “on an immigrant visa and alien 
 
F.2d 1067, 1068 (10th Cir. 1969). She claimed that her answers could lead to prosecution in 
Canada. See id. at 1069. The Supreme Court found the issue to be moot, probably because the 
grand jury had ceased to function. See id. at 1068 (“[I]t is clear that ‘once the grand jury 
ceases to function, the rationale for civil contempt vanishes’ and she must be released.” (cita-
tion omitted)). 
 51. 406 U.S. 472 (1972). 
 52. See id. at 478–79. To prove his claim, the witness pointed to several newspaper and 
magazine articles which “labeled appellant the ‘foremost internationalist’ in organized crime.” 
Id. at 479. 
 53. As opposed to remote and speculative possibilities. Id. at 478; see, e.g., Mason v. 
United States, 244 U.S. 362 (1917); Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131 (1913); Brown v. 
Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). 
 54. See Zicarelli, 406 U.S. at 480–81. 
 55. Id. at 481. 
 56. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 698 (1998). 
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registration issued at the American Consulate in Liverpool.”57 In 
1979, the Office of Special Investigations of the Criminal Division of 
the United States Department of Justice (“OSI”) was formed to de-
naturalize and deport suspected Nazi war criminals.58 While conduct-
ing an investigation into allegations against him, OSI subpoenaed 
Balsys to find out whether when he entered this country he lied on 
his visa application about participation in Nazi persecutions during 
World War II.59 Balsys appeared pursuant to the subpoena issued by 
OSI, but he refused to answer questions, claiming that his answers 
could be used against him in criminal prosecutions in Lithuania, Is-
rael, and Germany. The OSI petitioned the district court to enforce 
the subpoena, arguing that Balsys could not invoke his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination because 
the Fifth Amendment did not apply to prosecutions under foreign 
laws.60 The district court agreed with the OSI and ordered Balsys to 
testify. On appeal, the Second Circuit held “that a witness with a real 
and substantial fear of prosecution by a foreign country may assert 
the Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid giving testimony in a do-
mestic proceeding, even if the witness has no valid fear of a criminal 
prosecution in this country.”61 Because the circuit court’s decision 
created a circuit split between the Second and Eleventh Circuits, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.62 
Before the Supreme Court, Balsys argued that the Fifth Amend-
ment should be interpreted broadly. “The Self-Incrimination Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment provides that ‘[n]o person . . . shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.’”63 
Balsys argued that the word “any” was broad enough to include 
criminal prosecutions in foreign countries.64 The Supreme Court 
noted that the Constitution controls government actions only in the 
 
 57. Id. at 669. 
 58. See id. at 670, 699 n.18; United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1423 n.3 (11th 
Cir. 1997); 28 C.F.R. § 0.55(f) (1995); Belisle, supra note 1, at 349. 
 59. See Balsys, 524 U.S. at 670. 
 60. See id. 
 61. Id. at 670–71. 
 62. See id. at 671. The split occurred between United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122 (2d 
Cir. 1997) and United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419 (11th Cir. 1997), which held that a wit-
ness could not invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege in the face of possible foreign prosecu-
tion. 
 63. Balsys, 524 U.S. at 671 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V). 
 64. See id. at 672. 
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United States.65 Because the Constitution cannot guarantee rights 
outside of the United States, the Fifth Amendment cannot be relied 
upon to protect a person from self-incrimination because of possible 
foreign criminal prosecution.66 To explain this determination, the 
Court used the same-sovereign interpretation used in Murdock, to 
explain that the Fifth Amendment should not protect a witness fear-
ing foreign prosecution. 
Though Murphy overturned Murdock, the Supreme Court re-
jected the legal reasoning of Murphy in deciding Balsys and instead 
used the analysis in Murdock. Because Balsys’s arguments relied heav-
ily on the reasoning used to decide Murphy, especially the English 
cases, the Supreme Court carefully examined the logic of the Murphy 
decision but ultimately rejected it. The majority noted that “Murphy 
is a case invested with two alternative rationales.”67 The Murphy 
Court’s interpretation of the English cases supported one rationale—
that the Fifth Amendment protected witnesses fearing criminal 
prosecution in foreign jurisdictions.68 The other rationale rested on 
the decision issued the very same day in Malloy—that irrespective of 
where such statements were made neither state nor federal govern-
ments can prosecute a suspect using coerced self-incriminating 
statements made by the suspect in a prior judicial proceeding.69 
“Since there is no helpful legislative history”70 to explain the framers’ 
intentions regarding the Self-Incrimination Clause, the Balsys Court, 
like the Murphy Court, looked to the common law practice as it ex-
isted in England at the time of the framing.71 While the Murphy 
court found the English cases helpful to explain the logic for grant-
ing Fifth Amendment privileges to a witness whose testimony 
“might then be used to convict him of a crime against another such 
jurisdiction,”72 the Balsys Court did not find the cases as helpful. 73 In 
 
 65. See id. at 689. 
 66. See id. at 671. 
 67. Id. at 680. 
 68. See id. at 683. 
 69. See id. at 680–81. 
 70. Id. at 674. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 53 (1964). 
 73. The Balsys Court looked at four cases that the Murphy decision relied on and that 
were claimed to represent “the settled ‘English rule’ regarding self-incrimination under foreign 
law.” Murphy, 378 U.S. at 63. East India Co. v. Campbell, 1 Ves. Sen. 246, 27 Eng. Rep. 
1010 (Ex. 1749), was a case decided by the Court of Exchequer. In this case, a defendant re-
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Balsys, the majority found that the first two cases relied on in Murphy 
represented the same-sovereign doctrine because the courts of India 
and the ecclesiastical courts at the time of those decisions fell under 
the auspices of one sovereign.74 The Balsys Court dismissed the other 
two cases because they were decided long after the Fifth Amendment 
had been adopted.75 In addition, they did “not . . . support a general 
application of the privilege in any case in which a witness fears prose-
cution under foreign law by a party not before the court.”76 
Because the Balsys Court found that Murphy misapplied the Eng-
lish cases, it ruled that the first Murphy rationale—that the Fifth 
Amendment protected witnesses fearing criminal prosecution in for-
eign jurisdictions—could not be relied on.77 Because Murphy’s other 
rationale—that coerced statements may be used by any prosecutor 
because the Fifth Amendment applies to both state and federal ac-
tions—resulted from the Malloy decision to incorporate the Fifth 
Amendment, the Court determined that “to the extent that the 
Murphy majority went beyond its response to Malloy . . . its reason-
ing cannot be accepted.”78 Therefore, the Balsys Court concluded 
that Murphy could not be used to justify invoking the Fifth Amend-
ment for fear of foreign prosecution. Instead, the Court “rel[ied] on 
the force of [its] precedent, notably Murdock, as confirming this 
 
fused to provide information in an English court because the information could have been 
used against him in the courts of India. The court held that he did not have to provide the in-
formation. In Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. Sen. 244, 28 Eng. Rep. 157 (Ch. 1750), a 
woman refused to provide information about her marital status because the information could 
be used against her in an ecclesiastical court. The Lord Chancellor held that the woman should 
not be forced to provide the information because it would subject her to punishment in the 
other jurisdiction. These two cases were decided before the adoption of the United States 
Constitution. Two other cases decided after the adoption of the Constitution but which the 
Murphy court thought helped explain the English rule and the common law understanding of 
it in the United States were also examined. In King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 7 St. Tr. 
(N.S.) 1050, 61 Eng. Rep. 116 (V.C. 1851), the English Court of Chancery denied defen-
dants’ claim of privilege for fear of prosecution under the laws of Sicily. The court focused on 
the impossibility of consistent application and the risk that the defendants would avail them-
selves of the foreign jurisdiction to face prosecution. To counter this case, the Murphy court 
brought up the case of United States v. McRae, 3 L.R.-Ch. 79 (Ch. App. 1867). In this case, 
the Court of Chancery Appeal allowed the defendant to claim the privilege against self-
incrimination because he faced prosecution in the United States. 
 74. See United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 684–85 (1998). 
 75. See id. at 687. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at 683–88. 
 78. Id. at 688. 
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same-sovereign principle,”79 that the Fifth Amendment can only be 
applied to the extent of the reach of the Constitution.80 The Court 
relied on an overruled case to establish the limitations of the Fifth 
Amendment protections against self-incrimination. As a result, Balsys 
completely eliminated the ability of a witness to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment by claiming his testimony will subject him to prosecu-
tion in foreign countries, whether that fear is real and substantial or 
not.81 
In addition to these findings, the Supreme Court decided that, 
even before a foreign tribunal, Balsys could not invoke protections 
from self-incrimination because the right is “at best an emerging 
principle of international law.”82 Looking to international docu-
ments, the Court found that “[t]here is indeed nothing comparable 
to the Fifth Amendment privilege in any supranational prohibition 
against compelled self-incrimination derived from any source.”83 The 
Court noted in passing an argument that as a signatory to the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which contains a 
privilege similar to the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination, the United States could not compel Balsys’s testi-
mony.84 However, because Balsys did not make this argument, the 
Court refused to consider this issue.85 By making these observations, 
the majority opinion left open the possibility that as the privilege 
against self-incrimination becomes more recognized and accepted in 
international documents and by foreign nations the ability of a wit-
 
 79. Id. at 689. 
 80. See id. 
 81. It is interesting to note that after his appeals were denied by the Supreme Court 
Aloyzas Balsys voluntarily left the United States for Lithuania, refusing to be forced to testify 
against himself. See William C. Mann, Suspect in War Crimes Flees US Was Denied Shield of 5th 
Amendment, BOSTON GLOBE, May 31, 1999, at A3. Immediately after his departure, the 
Simon Wiesenthal Center, “an Israeli center that tracks Nazi war criminals[,] lashed out at 
Lithuania” for not prosecuting Balsys, claiming that he and seven other suspected Nazi war 
criminals who have “returned to Lithuania from the United States to escape legal action . . . 
were the beneficiaries of the benign neglect of the Lithuanian police and judiciary.” Israeli 
Center Slams Lithuania For Harboring Nazi War Criminals, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, May 
31, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2613356. 
 82. Balsys, 524 U.S. at 695 n.16 (quoting Diane Marie Amann, A Whipsaw Cuts Both 
Ways: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in an International Context, 45 UCLA L. REV. 
1201, 1259 (1998)). 
 83. Id. at 695 n.16 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. 
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ness to rely on the Fifth Amendment protections will be strength-
ened. 
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, noted that cooperative 
conduct between the United States and foreign countries might be-
come so collusive that fear of foreign prosecution could justify reli-
ance on the Fifth Amendment.86 
If it could be said that the United States and its allies had enacted 
substantially similar criminal codes aimed at prosecuting offenses of 
international character, and if it could be shown that the United 
States was granting immunity from domestic prosecution for the 
purpose of obtaining evidence to be delivered to other nations as 
prosecutors of a crime common to both countries, then an argu-
ment could be made that the Fifth Amendment should apply based 
on fear of foreign prosecution simply because that prosecution was 
not fairly characterized as distinctly “foreign.” The point would be 
that the prosecution was as much on behalf of the United States as 
of the prosecuting nation, so that the division of labor between 
evidence gatherer and prosecutor made one nation the agent of the 
other, rendering fear of foreign prosecution tantamount to fear of a 
criminal case brought by the Government itself.87 
The Court noted that Balsys’ situation did not amount to “a coop-
erative prosecution” and that the Fifth Amendment privilege will not 
lose its meaning by not being extended to Balsys.88 From this dicta, 
it seems that if the United States and another nation enact similar 
criminal legislation and the United States conducts the investigation 
to aid the foreign nation’s prosecution, then a witness can invoke the 
Fifth Amendment to protect her from testifying. This language cre-
ates the test upon which the appellants in In re Impounded relied. 
III. IN RE IMPOUNDED AND THE BALSYS TEST 
A. The Facts 
The question in In re Impounded is whether fear of foreign 
prosecution under the Balsys exception test triggers the Fifth 
Amendment privilege. The appellants in In re Impounded received 
subpoenas to testify before a special grand jury that was investigating 
 
 86. See id. at 698. 
 87. Id. at 698–99. 
 88. Id. at 699. 
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“possible price-fixing or other anticompetitive agreements among 
manufacturers and distributors in the artificial sausage casings indus-
try.”89 As employees of a targeted corporation, the appellants re-
ceived subpoenas and immunity orders to compel their testimony. 
Each appellant appeared before the grand jury and stated that he 
would answer questions concerning business dealings within the 
United States but refused to answer questions regarding activities 
“occurr[ing] in the United States and relat[ing] to foreign markets 
or occurr[ing] outside the United States.”90 The appellants claimed 
that the immunity grant insufficiently protected them from foreign 
prosecution.91 When the government initiated contempt penalties, 
the appellants claimed that the United States government had con-
tacts with foreign governments and was sharing information “for the 
purpose of foreign prosecutions.”92 
In order to obtain further proof of a joint prosecution, appellants 
requested a hearing where they could question government wit-
nesses. To answer this request, the government provided affidavits, 
which stated that the witnesses’ testimony would be used only for 
grand jury purposes and would not be delivered to foreign coun-
tries.93 Because the appellants asserted that the government was 
holding information back, the district court held more hearings “that 
focused on the nature and extent of appellants’ asserted Fifth 
Amendment rights.”94 After these hearings, the trial court ruled that 
the testimony would only be used for prosecution in the United 
States and denied the appellants’ motion to compel more informa-
tion because they had not raised a genuine issue of material fact.95 
After the grand jury investigation continued, the appellants again 
made requests for an evidentiary hearing and disclosure on the 
grounds that new evidence, which surfaced in the grand jury investi-
gation, increased the need for explanation.96 Again, the court denied 
the motion because the evidence provided by appellants was “‘imma-
 
 89. In re Impounded, 178 F.3d 150, 152 (3d Cir. 1999). The grand jury was specifi-
cally looking for violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1997). See id. 
 90. In re Impounded, 178 F.3d at 152. 
 91. See id. 
 92. Id. at 153. 
 93. See id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See id. 
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terial and inadequate.’”97 Because the court found that “Balsys did 
not provide a basis for appellants’ claims of Fifth Amendment privi-
lege,”98 it held the appellants in contempt.99 
Appellants claimed that their Fifth Amendment privilege should 
be upheld because of the Supreme Court’s holding in Balsys.100 Even 
though the Court in Balsys held that fear of foreign prosecution was 
beyond the scope of the Fifth Amendment, Justice Souter intimated 
in the majority decision that under certain circumstances the Fifth 
Amendment might be invoked to protect a person from providing 
self-incriminating testimony.101 The appellants claimed this language 
created a test and that their situation met the qualifications of the 
test. According to the appellants, the test contained the following 
elements: “1) [that] the witness’s fear of foreign prosecution is rea-
sonable; 2) [that] the fear is based on a foreign criminal statute sub-
stantively similar to United States law; and 3) [that] the testimony is 
being taken with a purpose that it will be shared with a foreign gov-
ernment.”102 At a hearing before the district court, the appellants ar-
gued that they should be able to invoke their Fifth Amendment 
privilege because their situation met the elements of the test.103 
B. The Reasoning 
To support their argument, the appellants attempted to show 
that the grand jury investigation was “an instance of cooperative in-
ternational antitrust enforcement.”104 Evidence included selections 
from speeches given by officials from the Antitrust Division of the 
United States Department of Justice (“Antitrust Division”) on the 
international efforts to enforce antitrust laws and attempts to work 
with other nations to share evidence and information on antitrust in-
vestigations. The appellants brought out evidence concerning coop-
eration with the Canadian government in two prior criminal antitrust 
investigations.105 In addition, the appellants indicated that Argentina, 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. 
 100. 524 U.S. 666 (1998). 
 101. See id. at 698–99. 
 102. In re Impounded, 178 F.3d at 155. 
 103. See id. at 152. 
 104. Id.  
 105. See id. 
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Canada, Chile, Ireland, France, Japan, Korea, Norway, Spain, Tai-
wan, Thailand, and the Philippines all had enacted criminal penalties 
for antitrust violations. They also argued that Mutual Legal Assis-
tance Treaties106 (“MLATS”) and the International Antitrust En-
forcement Assistance Act107 could be used to share information ob-
tained by the grand jury with foreign governments.108 
In addition to the evidence showing the increased internationali-
zation of antitrust investigations, the appellants argued that specific 
acts occurred in their case showing that other countries were seeking 
their testimony. As proof of joint prosecution, the appellants pointed 
out that they had been asked by the grand jury about contacts in 
Canada and Germany. They also noted that efforts had been made 
by the Antitrust Division to collect documents in Canada, Spain, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, Mexico, France, and other nations.109 
The Antitrust Division had attempted to interview Mexican and 
German nationals to get information for the grand jury investigation, 
and one of appellants’ counsel had actually been contacted by Cana-
dian authorities.110 Appellants felt that all these facts pointed to a 
joint prosecution where the appellants would be compelled to give 
testimony in the United States but face prosecution in foreign coun-
tries.111 
On appeal before the Third Circuit, appellants recognized that 
the Balsys opinion already discussed at length the issue regarding the 
Fifth Amendment and foreign prosecution. However, they argued 
that Justice Souter outlined a “test” for exceptions to the Balsys rule 
and that the facts of their case met the requirements of the test.112 
 
 106. According to information available at Balsys’ appeal, the United States has signed 
such treaties with at least 20 individual countries. See Balsys, 524 U.S at 715 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting). Many are limited to drug trafficking and terrorism. Others are broad and cover many 
different areas of illegal activity. Assistance includes such things as obtaining testimony or 
statements, providing documents and records, serving documents, locating and identifying 
people, executing searches and seizures, immobilizing and forfeiting assets, and any other assis-
tance requested by the other country. See Treaty with Australia on Mutual Assistance in Crimi-
nal Matters, Apr. 30, 1997, U.S.-Austl., art. 1, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-27 (1997). 
 107. 15 U.S.C. § 6201. This Act allows the Attorney General to assist foreign prosecu-
tors by providing information regarding suspected violators of foreign antitrust laws or by as-
sisting in enforcing those laws. 
 108. See In re Impounded, 178 F.3d at 152. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See id. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. at 154. 
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They claimed that they had a reasonable fear of foreign prosecution, 
that their fear was based on criminal statutes in several foreign coun-
tries, and that their testimony would be shared with these foreign 
countries.113 They argued that the investigation was a joint interna-
tional prosecution and that these facts met the Balsys test.114 
After listening to appellants’ arguments, the circuit court “re-
main[ed] unconvinced that Balsys necessarily establishes a ‘test,’ let 
alone the test [appellants] urge.”115 The circuit court rejected this 
argument because the language quoted from Balsys is couched in 
conditional, nonprescriptive language. The Third Circuit also 
pointed out that the Supreme Court wrote the “test” language used 
by the appellants as dicta; it was meant to be used “for another 
day”116 not as a test that courts could readily apply.117 It also con-
cluded that even if the circuit court decided that the Balsys language 
created a test it would not support the appellants’ argument because 
their arguments were insufficient.118 Either way, the court deter-
mined that the defendants could not invoke their Fifth Amendment 
right to silence. 
After looking at the actions of the government in Balsys, the 
Third Circuit felt the facts showed that the actions in this case and 
the actions in Balsys were similar. In Balsys, the United States and 
Lithuania had agreed to cooperate in the prosecution of war 
crimes.119 This agreement included “mutual legal assistance concern-
ing the prosecution of persons suspected of having committed war 
crimes”120 and assistance in locating witnesses and making witnesses 
available.121 The OSI, which sought the testimony from Balsys, was 
“to act as a liaison with foreign prosecution offices and to use re-
 
 113. See id. at 152, 154. 
 114. See id. 
 115. Id. at 155. 
 116. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 699 (1998). 
 117. The decision in Balsys came out just over eight months before the arguments for In 
re Impounded occurred before the Third Circuit. Because the Balsys decision was so recent, the 
circuit court may have avoided challenging the decision so soon. 
 118. In re Impounded, 178 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 119. See Balsys, 524 U.S. at 699. 
 120. Id. at 699 n.19 (quoting Memorandum of Understanding Between the United 
States Department of Justice and the Office of the Procurator General of the Republic of 
Lithuania Concerning Cooperation in the Pursuit of War Criminals, Aug. 3, 1992, reprinted in 
App. in No. 96-6144 (CA2), 396-97); see also In re Impounded, 178 F.3d at 155. 
 121. See id. 
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sources for investigations, guidance, information, and analysis, and 
to direct and coordinate prosecutions.”122 Though the United States 
government worked closely with the Lithuanian government, the 
Balsys majority did not see this cooperative effort as enough “coop-
erative prosecution” to justify Balsys’ claim.123 Since Balsys did not 
qualify for the exception, then, said the Third Circuit, assertions 
made by the appellants should not qualify now. Appellants claimed 
that gathering of evidence in foreign countries, questioning foreign 
nationals about antitrust actions in their country, and the possibility 
of criminal prosecution in other countries for antitrust activities ex-
hibit characteristics of “cooperative prosecution.”124 Looking at 
those countries that had passed criminal laws against antitrust activi-
ties the court determined that the possibility of prosecution was in-
consequential. The court pointed out that most of these nations 
“have never had a successful criminal antitrust investigation or have 
never utilized the criminal antitrust provisions, or enforce antitrust 
violations through administrative proceedings.”125 This information, 
the court argued, shows that only a possibility of prosecution exists; 
no imminent prosecution faces the witnesses.126 Therefore, the Third 
Circuit held that the Fifth Amendment does not now apply.127 
The court also focused on whether the witnesses faced a real and 
substantial fear of foreign prosecution.128 While the district court 
judge had noted the reasonableness of the witness’s fear of foreign 
prosecution,129 the circuit court determined that the language was 
vague and did not properly assess the meaning of “real and substan-
tial fear of prosecution.”130 The standard, according to the Third 
Circuit, for examining a question of real and substantial fear of  
 
 
 122. In re Impounded, 178 F.3d at 155–56 (citation omitted); see also Balsys, 524 U.S. at 
699 n.18. 
 123. See In re Impounded, 178 F.3d at 156. 
 124. See id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See id. 
 127. However, even this court recognized that different facts could lead to a different 
conclusion. The court stated that “[t]he authorities that appellants cite, either in their own 
particular case or in terms of trends in Antitrust Division policies, may indicate that such a case 
might present itself to us at some point in the future.” Id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See id at 156–57. 
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foreign prosecution comes from a Second Circuit decision.131 In re 
Flanagan132 created a test with the following factors: 
[(1)] whether there is an existing or potential foreign prosecution 
of [a witness]; [(2)] what foreign charges could be filed against 
[that witness]; [(3)] whether prosecution . . . would be initiated or 
furthered by . . . testimony; [(4)] whether any such charges would 
entitle the foreign jurisdiction to have [an individual] extradited 
from the United States; and [(5)] whether there is a likelihood that 
[any] testimony given here would be disclosed to the foreign gov-
ernment.133 
Looking at the Flanagan factors, the court found that the wit-
nesses did not meet their burden of proof. First, the court found that 
the witnesses had not shown an appropriate nexus and a high likeli-
hood of actual prosecution as required in a host of other cases.134 
Additionally, the criminal antitrust laws of the foreign countries were 
not applied in a way to strike fear in the appellants. The court held 
that any assertion that a prosecution may be possible does not neces-
sarily require a finding that an existing or prospective prosecution ex-
ists.135 Finally, the court decided that the appellants did not meet the 
fourth Flanagan factor because the existence of extradition treaties 
with foreign countries does not require a finding that such treaties 
will be used and that the appellants have a real and substantial fear of 
prosecution.136 Because appellants were unable to prove these 
 
 131. See id. at 157. The case is In re Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 132. 691 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 133. Id. at 121. 
 134. See id.; In re Impounded, 178 F.3d 150, 157 (3d Cir. 1999) (“See United States v. 
Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1425–26 (11th Cir. 1997) (potential war crimes prosecution as a result 
of imminent expulsion from United States created real and substantial fear of foreign prosecu-
tion); United States v. Under Seal, 794 F.2d 920, 924–25 (4th Cir. 1986) (existing prosecu-
tion and possibility of extradition created a real and substantial fear of prosecution); Moses v. 
Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857, 863–69 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (criminal investigation pending in Swit-
zerland, nexus existed between information requested in proceeding and pending prosecution, 
and witness faced possibility of extradition, so real and substantial fear of prosecution); 
Mishima v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 131, 132–33 (D. Ala. 1981) (where conduct was 
criminalized under Japanese law, and cases had been referred to a Japanese prosecutor, wit-
nesses had demonstrated real and substantial fear of prosecution, where as witnesses whose 
cases had not been referred to a prosecutor had not demonstrated such a fear); In re Cardassi, 
351 F. Supp. 1080, 1083–84 (D. Conn. 1972) (questions witness refused to answer con-
cerned events in Mexico, potential acts were incriminating under Mexican law, and Mexican 
authorities had expressed an interest in the case)”). 
 135. See In re Impounded, 178 F.3d at 158. 
 136. See id. 
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Flanagan factors, the Third Circuit determined that the appellants 
had not shown a real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution. 
Because the appellants did not prove real and substantial fear of 
foreign prosecution and the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion, the circuit court upheld the district court’s determination that 
the appellants could not invoke their Fifth Amendment right to si-
lence despite the Balsys exception. 
IV. ANALYSIS FOR “ANOTHER DAY” 
In In re Impounded, the Third Circuit attempted to address 
whether the language in the Balsys decision created a test for excep-
tions and how to apply that test. This Note argues that the Supreme 
Court clearly discussed an exception in Balsys, describing a situation 
in which a witness could invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination for fear of foreign criminal prosecution. 
However, some argue that an exception to Balsys should not be al-
lowed because courts cannot easily apply the elements of the test. 
When Murdock was decided, few thought the Fifth Amendment 
should be used by witnesses in state courts; however, as time and 
technology changed, the need to re-explore Murdock led to Murphy’s 
holding that the Self-Incrimination Clause barred the use of com-
pelled testimony in any criminal proceeding. Just as time brought 
about the overruling of Murdock, time will bring about the overrul-
ing of Balsys, as is shown by the conditional language used by Justice 
Souter. 
Though some people will be unwilling to accept the idea that 
Balsys will eventually be overruled, the symmetry between Murdock 
and Balsys will likely be followed by a similar symmetry between 
Murphy and a future Supreme Court case. The Balsys decision even 
hints that this situation is destined to occur. The analysis employed 
in that future case may not mirror that of Murphy, but the result will 
be the same. The Fifth Amendment should be able to protect United 
States citizens from all abuses of power by the United States gov-
ernment. The sooner the Supreme Court recognizes that “interna-
tional cooperatism” has developed to such an extent that United 
States actions are providing testimonial fodder for foreign criminal 
prosecutions, the sooner the Constitution can again provide the pro-
tections guaranteed to all United States citizens. 
To support this argument, this section will establish that time 
and the development of “international cooperatism” will bring about 
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the changes that will cause Balsys to be reconsidered. Justice Souter’s 
language suggests a test governing when this will occur. Develop-
ments in international cooperation and the foundation of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court show that the test factors will exist much 
sooner than some may think.137 Second, this section will examine the 
factors that the Court should take into account, including the ele-
ments of the Balsys exception test. It will also examine the existence 
of comparable privileges in supranational or other documents provid-
ing the appropriate limits for applying the Fifth Amendment to for-
eign prosecution. Developing the limits along these lines should off-
set the concerns raised by those who oppose applying the Fifth 
Amendment to protect any witness that fears foreign prosecution 
and will show why there really is a need for allowing exceptions to or 
a review of the Balsys decision. With increasing cooperation between 
foreign countries and increased use of a similar right to silence in 
foreign jurisdictions, courts should be able to protect United States 
citizens from allowing the United States government to abuse its 
power and compel testimony that would subject these citizens to 
foreign prosecution. 
A. History and Its Own Language Sow the Seeds of Balsys’s Downfall 
1. Will history repeat itself? 
Just as time and technology changed to allow for the develop-
ment of “cooperative federalism”138 during the first half of the twen-
tieth century, technology and time have changed to bolster the de-
velopment of “cooperative internationalism.” Murdock established a 
standard that a witness could not use the Self-Incrimination Clause 
to refuse to provide immunized testimony because of a fear of prose-
cution for state crimes. The likelihood that state and federal criminal 
issues would overlap enough for testimony to be shared seemed very 
 
 137. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N Doc. A/Conf.183/9* (July 
12, 1999) also available at <http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm>. Once the 
Rome Statute has been adopted and ratified by enough nations, the International Criminal 
Court will “have . . . power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes 
of international concern . . . and shall be complimentary to national criminal jurisdictions.” Id. 
art. 1. The International Criminal Court has not yet been established because it has only been 
ratified by twenty-one countries of the sixty necessary for creation. See Ratification Status (vis-
ited Sept. 22, 2000) <http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/status.htm>. 
 138. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 56 (1964). 
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unlikely.139 Over time, and as more and more instances occurred 
where state courts tried to use compelled testimony against federal 
witnesses in state prosecutions and federal courts tried to use com-
pelled testimony against state witnesses in federal prosecutions, the 
Court had to address the issue anew.140 In the end, Murdock was 
overturned because the Court recognized that Fifth Amendment 
privileges should protect all United States citizens whose testimony 
could be used against them in any criminal prosecution—federal or 
state. The fact was that federal agents cooperated so closely with 
state officers in prosecuting alleged criminals that the Murdock dis-
tinction between state and federal actions had become a meaningless 
distinction, and the Court used the English Rule to justify its conclu-
sion. 
Like Murdock, Balsys attempts to establish the rule that the Fifth 
Amendment cannot protect a witness who fears that his testimony 
might be used against him in foreign prosecutions. The Court de-
termined that it could afford to sacrifice the constitutionally guaran-
teed rights of United States citizens because “domestic law enforce-
ment would suffer serious consequences if fear of foreign prosecution 
were recognized as sufficient to invoke the privilege.”141 However, it 
was admitted that “[b]ecause crime, like legitimate trade, is increas-
ingly international, a corresponding degree of international coopera-
tion is coming to characterize the enterprise of criminal prosecu-
tion.”142 The Balsys Court realized that methods of criminal 
prosecution increasingly involve cooperative action, and Justice 
Souter’s language in the decision shows that even as they decided 
this issue the Justices could foresee future changes affecting the logic 
of their decision. Just as subsequent cases attacked and weakened the 
arguments made in Murdock, In re Impounded evidences that subse-
quent cases will attack and undermine the arguments made in Balsys. 
 
 
 139. “The investigation was under federal law in respect of federal matters. . . . Investiga-
tions for federal purposes may not be prevented by matters depending upon state law.” United 
States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 149 (1931). At the time, there was a clearer distinction be-
tween federal and state matters than there is today. 
 140. See supra Part II.B–C. 
 141. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 698 (1998). 
 142. Id. at 693–94. 
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2. Is there really a test? 
The Third Circuit questioned whether the language in Balsys cre-
ated a test. The court reasoned that because the Balsys language con-
tained conditional language (i.e., “could be said,” “could be ar-
gued”)143 the Supreme Court did not intend to create a test.144 To 
the Third Circuit, the words described only a hypothetical situation 
not containing any applicable rules that a court could discern; rather 
it was just a possibility that would have to be decided another day. 
It is clear that the language in Balsys set forth certain factors that 
would push the Court to the point where the Self-Incrimination 
Clause would protect a witness facing foreign prosecution. The 
Court wrote in Balsys that 
[i]f it could be said that the United States and its allies had enacted 
substantially similar codes aimed at prosecuting offenses of interna-
tional character, and if it could be shown that the United States 
was granting immunity from domestic prosecutions for the purpose 
of obtaining evidence to be delivered to other nations as prosecu-
tion of a crime common to both countries, then an argument could 
be made that the Fifth Amendment should apply based on fear of 
foreign prosecution simply because that prosecution was not fairly 
characterized as distinctly “foreign.”145 
A straight reading of this language leads directly to the conclusion 
that the Supreme Court, by including this specific language, created 
a list of facts that would overcome their final decision in Balsys. The 
Court prefaced this language by stating, “This is not to say that co-
operative conduct between the United States and foreign nations 
could not develop to a point at which a claim could be made for rec-
ognizing fear of foreign prosecution under the Self-Incrimination 
Clause.”146 Using this language, the Court indicated that developing 
closer relations with other countries would justify a witness’s invoca-
tion of the Fifth Amendment privileges. By following this language 
with a list of factors that would indicate when the appropriate point 
had been reached, the Court articulated a test allowing other courts 
to find exceptions to the Balsys decision. 
 
 143. In re Impounded, 178 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 144. See id. 
 145. Balsys, 524 U.S. at 698. 
 146. Id. 
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3. Arguments against application of the Balsys exception test 
Some commentators fear that allowing an exception to Balsys will 
create too much confusion in the courts. In particular, they argue 
that requiring judges to determine whether a witness has a “real and 
substantial” fear of foreign prosecution asks courts to do something 
they are “ill-suited” to do.147 To support this argument, critics claim 
that United States courts do not understand foreign laws or know 
how to appropriately apply them; that witnesses would abuse the sys-
tem by relying on foreign laws to avoid being compelled to testify; or 
that foreign governments would create laws in order to protect their 
nationals from being compelled to testify in the United States.148 
Critics also argue that granting Fifth Amendment protections to wit-
nesses fearing foreign prosecution would be an inappropriate exten-
sion of the Constitution. Because the factors of the Balsys exception 
test address these issues, the Fifth Amendment should be allowed to 
protect United States citizens from being forced to give incriminat-
ing testimony by United States courts. 
One argument against an exception to Balsys relies on an as-
sumption that United States judges do not know and would be un-
able to apply foreign law.149 While United States judges daily use and 
apply state and federal laws, to which they have easy access, some ar-
gue that using and applying foreign law would place too heavy a 
burden on these judges because of their lack of experience with for-
eign laws. This argument has no basis in reality because United 
States judges already deal frequently with foreign laws. Courts often 
confront cases where foreign parties and even United States parties 
argue that foreign law should control. “It is settled that the mere fact 
that the court is called upon to determine and apply foreign law does 
not present a legal problem of the sort which would justify the dis-
missal of a case otherwise properly before the court.”150 When the 
court is required to apply foreign law, “the rules of the foreign law 
and their interpretation are simply questions of fact, and the conclu-
 
 147. Anthony L. Osterlund, Comment, Showdown at the Constitutional Corral: Self-
Incrimination v. Potential Foreign Prosecution, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 628–29 (1999). 
 148. See id. at 628–36. 
 149. See id. at 628–29. 
 150. Hoffman v. Goberman, 420 F.2d 423, 427 (3d Cir. 1970) (citing Burt v. Isthmus 
Dev. Co., 218 F.2d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 1955)). 
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sion is as reviewable as any other fact issue.”151 Additionally, as will 
later be discussed, the Balsys exception would place the burden on 
the witness to identify and explain the foreign laws upon which he 
bases his fear of prosecution.152 
Because the Balsys exception test looks at a witness’s fear of for-
eign prosecution, some argue that witnesses will abuse the right or 
that foreign governments will protect their nationals. These argu-
ments assume that people who might potentially be compelled to 
testify in United States courts (like criminals involved in international 
drug trafficking) would increase their contacts with a variety of coun-
tries.153 By increasing their contacts, they increase the complexity of 
any case brought against them to compel them to testify because 
they could rely on multiple foreign laws to substantiate their fear of 
foreign prosecution. Another variation of this argument assumes that 
foreign countries will enact laws to keep their nationals from testify-
ing in United States courts. For example, a country could make it a 
capital crime to testify before a United States tribunal or court. Any 
national from that country from whom a United States prosecutor 
seeks to compel testimony could point to that law to show a fear of 
foreign prosecution. To become subject to foreign prosecution, a 
witness must give testimony and then become subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the foreign court by willingly entering that country or being 
extradited. The Balsys exception test would take into account 
whether the witness will become subject to the foreign jurisdiction 
and whether the fear of foreign prosecution is real and substantial.154 
Relying heavily on the territorial reach of the Constitution, op-
ponents of extending Fifth Amendment privileges to witnesses who 
fear foreign prosecution argue that an exception to Balsys will inap-
propriately expand the reach of the Constitution.155 The Fifth 
Amendment was adopted to protect witnesses from government 
abuse—from the government forcing a witness to face “the ‘cruel 
trilemma’ of self-accusation, perjury, and contempt.”156 By compel-
ling a witness to give self-incriminating testimony that can be used in 
foreign prosecutions, the United States government forces the cruel 
 
 151. Burt, 218 F.2d at 357. 
 152. See infra Part IV.B. 
 153. See Osterlund, supra note 147, at 631–33. 
 154. See infra Part IV.B. 
 155. See Winger, supra note 49, at 1132–33. 
 156. Id. at 1133. 
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trilemma on an international scale.157 If such testimony is used 
against the witness by a prosecutor in another country, the United 
States government would arguably be violating the witness’s consti-
tutional rights by compelling self-incriminating testimony. The Con-
stitution should protect the rights of the people from abuses of gov-
ernment, especially when the government can benefit at the expense 
of an individual’s freedom. 
B. How and When the Fifth Amendment Will Protect United States 
Citizens 
1. What are the elements to consider in foreign prosecution situations? 
In the dicta of Balsys, Justice Souter identified several factors that 
courts should consider when determining whether the Fifth 
Amendment should protect witnesses fearing foreign prosecution.158 
Justice Souter indicated that courts should consider at least three fac-
tors: “the witness’s fear of foreign prosecution,” 159 whether that fear 
“is based on a foreign criminal statute substantively similar to United 
States law,” 160 and whether the purpose of taking the testimony is to 
share it with a foreign government.161 Using this language, the 
appellants in In re Impounded made a valiant effort to convince the 
court that they met the three factors, but they were unable to do 
so.162 While the appellants argued for a reasonable fear of foreign 
prosecution standard, the Third Circuit used a real and substantial 
fear standard because the Supreme Court noted in Zicarelli that the 
Self Incrimination Clause protects only against real threats, “not re-
mote and speculative possibilities.”163 
In addition, the Supreme Court will probably look to see if the 
self-incrimination privilege exists in the foreign country or in supra-
national documents. One of the Court’s concerns in Balsys was that 
other countries would not recognize the privilege.164 Even if a wit-
 
 157. See id. at 1133–37. 
 158. See supra Part IV.A. 
 159. See In re Impounded, 178 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 160. Id. 
 161. See id. 
 162. See United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 698–99 (1998). 
 163. Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm’n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 478 (1972). 
 164. See Balsys, 524 U.S. at 695. 
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ness were allowed to invoke the Fifth Amendment in the United 
States, the inference of guilt could likely be used against the witness 
during a criminal prosecution in the foreign country. Increasingly, 
though, more countries are beginning to recognize a right to silence. 
“Although the privilege against self-incrimination . . . may not yet be 
described as customary international law, an international right to si-
lence is emerging among those ‘generally recognized international 
standards which lie at the heart of the notion of fair procedure.’”165 
The Draft Statutes of the International Criminal Court serve as an 
example. These statutes include a “right to remain silent without 
such silence being a consideration in the determination of guilt or 
innocence”166 and states that a person shall “not be compelled to tes-
tify or to confess guilt.”167 As the recognition of the right to silence 
grows in other countries and international tribunals, the likelihood 
that the Supreme Court will recognize the right to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment when facing foreign prosecution increases because the 
ability to achieve the benefits of that right will have increased. 
2. Determining real and substantial fear: In re Flanagan168 and other 
cases 
When the Supreme Court does find the right circumstances to 
apply the Balsys exception test, it will need to determine how to ap-
ply the elements of the test, especially to determine real and substan-
tial fear. In In re Impounded, the Third Circuit noted that “the stan-
dard for real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution is set forth in 
the Second Circuit’s decision of In re Flanagan.”169 The In re 
Flanagan court considered five factors to determine whether a wit-
ness had a real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution.170 Other 
 
 165. Diane Marie Amann, Application of Fifth Amendment to U.S. Constitution in Inter-
national Context—Fear of Foreign Prosecution as Ground for Invoking Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination—Relevance of Growing International Law Enforcement Cooperation—Role of 
U.S. Judiciary in Foreign Relations, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 759, 763 (1998) (quoting Murray v. 
United Kingdom, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29(30), 60(49), para. 45 (1996)). 
 166. United Nations International Law Commission: Report of the Working Group on a 
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, July 16, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 253, 272 (1994). 
 167. Id. 
 168. 691 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 169. In re Impounded, 178 F.3d 150, 157 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation to Flanagan omit-
ted, the Third Circuit formally adopted the Flanagan test in Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. 
Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988)). 
 170. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text. 
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circuits have adopted similar standards.171 By using the factors dis-
cussed in these cases to make determinations of a real and substantial  
fear of foreign prosecution, courts can reasonably apply the Balsys ex-
ception test. 
In Balsys, the Supreme Court simply conceded that a real and 
substantial fear of foreign prosecution existed and did not try to ex-
amine the issue. Under the Balsys exception test, the witness would 
have to show that a substantially similar criminal law exists in a for-
eign country. Then she would have to show a real and substantial 
fear of prosecution under that law. Some reasons given against allow-
ing a witness to use the Fifth Amendment focus on the inability of 
domestic courts to appropriately identify and apply foreign law.172 
Because the witness must identify the law under which she might be 
prosecuted, identifying and applying the law will be greatly simpli-
fied. The Flanagan factors that show a real and substantial fear of 
foreign prosecution also consider the identification of the potential 
charges to be made. 
When the Supreme Court considered the problem of foreign 
prosecution in Zicarelli, it also pointed out that the foreign law 
would be an important consideration. Because the testimony in Zi-
carelli did not place the witness in any real danger of foreign prose-
cution, the Court did not look into the matter.173 Had it been an is-
sue, the Court would have considered the question whether the 
testimony would incriminate a witness under the law of a foreign 
country, thereby subjecting her to criminal prosecution. Because the 
Supreme Court would have taken the law into consideration, courts 
should use the Flanagan factors to determine if a real and substantial 
fear exists. 
The question of whether an existing or potential prosecution ex-
ists will be a very important consideration in determining whether a 
witness can invoke the Fifth Amendment. The In re Impounded ap-
pellants claimed that their testimony could be used in Argentina, 
Canada, Chile, Ireland, France, Japan, Korea, Norway, Spain, Tai-
 
 171. In United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1425 (11th Cir. 1997), the Eleventh Cir-
cuit identified three of the same five factors that Flanagan used: the likelihood that testimony 
would be shared with or disclosed to a foreign country, the existence of or potential for a for-
eign prosecution, and the possibility of extradition. 
 172. See, e.g., Osterlund, supra note 147, at 627. 
 173. See Zicarelli v. New Jersey Comm’n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 480 (1972). 
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wan, Thailand, and the Philippines.174 To qualify under the Balsys 
test, the appellants should have shown that  
there is an existing or potential foreign prosecution . . . ; what for-
eign charges could be filed against [them]; [that] prosecution of 
[the charges] would be initiated or furthered by [their] testimony; 
[that] any such charges would entitle the foreign jurisdiction to 
have [them] extradited from the United States; and [that] there is a 
likelihood that [their] testimony . . . would be disclosed to the for-
eign government.175  
According to the Third Circuit, the In re Impounded appellants did 
not meet this burden. It noted, as the Flanagan court did, that these 
factors are construed narrowly.176 Though future witnesses will find 
their task difficult, it will not be impossible. Because of the growing 
international cooperation between the United States and foreign 
countries in the prosecution of crimes, the Supreme Court will be 
faced with more and more questions regarding the Balsys exception. 
While the In re Impounded appellants may not have reached the nec-
essary requirements to bring about change, the increase in interna-
tional cooperation nearly guarantees that someone will. 
3. When will the conditions be right? 
The increasing amount of cooperation between the United 
States and foreign countries mirrors the increasing cooperation be-
tween federal and state governments, which led to the Murphy deci-
sion.177 Not only are nations cooperating more, but the notion of a 
privilege against self-incrimination is also gaining increasing accep-
tance throughout the world.178 The rules of procedure and evidence 
for the International Criminal Court provide for the protection of 
certain self-incriminating testimony.179 
 
 174. See In re Impounded, 178 F.3d at 152. 
 175. In re Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 176. See In re Impounded, 178 F.3d at 157; In re Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 121. 
 177. See Sara A. Leahy, Note, United States v. Balsys: Foreign Prosecution and the Appli-
cability of the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 987, 
1033–34 (1999) (citing Diane Marie Amann, supra note 82, at 1208). 
 178. See id. at 1036. 
 179. See Report on the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court 
Addendum Finalized Draft Text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 74 Self In-
crimination by a Witness, PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.1 (July 12, 2000), also available at 
<http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/rules/english/add1e.pdf>. 
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While the world increasingly recognizes a right against self-
incrimination, countries are also increasingly entering into agree-
ments to cooperate in prosecuting criminals. In recent years, the 
United States has entered into a number of agreements with other 
countries (often called Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties or MLATS) 
to cooperate with criminal prosecution.180 For example, the United 
States has entered into anti-competition treaties with the European 
Union establishing “cooperative procedures to achieve the most ef-
fective and efficient enforcement of competition law . . . where the 
competition authorities of the other Party are able and prepared to 
examine and take effective sanctions under their law to deal with 
those activities.”181 In 1991, this agreement merely regarded trade in 
steel. Now it applies to all forms of trade.182 The United States re-
cently held hearings to ratify ten new MLATS. These new treaties 
were introduced as being “similar to thirty-six bilateral MLATS that 
have entered into force with countries throughout the world.”183 
The number of MLATS is obviously increasing and expanding the 
obligations of the United States to cooperate with foreign nations in 
investigating and prosecuting crimes. It is interesting to note that 
“[a]lthough MLATS are specifically intended to be used in criminal 
matters, the Securities and Exchange Commission has used them to 
investigate securities violations punishable by criminal sanctions.”184 
Even MLATS are considered in today’s fast-paced world to be 
“cumbersome weapons.”185 
A quicker form of international cooperation, Memorandums of 
Understanding (“MOUS”), is becoming the agreement of choice 
among information and evidence gatherers. MOUS are “regulator-
 
 180. In the last ten years, the United States has entered into at least thirteen MLATS. 
These countries include Austria, Australia, Great Britain, South Korea, Russia, and Poland. 
 181. Agreement Between The Government of the United States of America and the 
European Communities on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement 
of Their Competition Laws, June 3–4, 1998, art. 1, § 2(b), State Dept. No. 98-106 (entered 
into force June 4, 1998). 
 182. See generally id. This agreement is not specifically limited to the steel trade but to 
the broad “enforcement of competition law.” Id. § 2(b). 
 183. Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm. (statement of Samuel M. Witten, 
Assistant Legal Adviser for Law Enforcement and Intelligence, United States Department of 
State) available in 2000 WL 238322478. 
 184. John K. Carroll & Herbert S. Washer, Globalization Comes to Law Enforcement, 
N.Y.L.J., July 10, 2000, at 9. 
 185. Id. 
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to-regulator agreements [that] typically provide for broad coopera-
tion in response to specific requests, and often establish designated 
channels for consultation on matters of mutual interest.”186 Because 
they can be modified without formal amendment (unlike MLATS) 
and use broad and flexible language, MOUS are becoming more 
popular with United States regulators and prosecutors.187 MOUS en-
tered into between United States and foreign agencies have allowed 
the sharing of information188 which has “resulted in criminal and civil 
proceedings” both in the United States and abroad.189 Not just 
governments, but also agencies within governments are entering into 
agreements with each other to gather and share information with the 
goal of prosecuting offenders. 
The formation of an International Criminal Court (“ICC”) will 
also intensify international cooperation in prosecuting criminals.190 
Citizens from countries who become members of the ICC will be-
come subject to the jurisdiction of a transnational court that can in-
vestigate and prosecute crimes at its own initiative. 
Because the United States is increasing its cooperation with other 
nations to prosecute criminals, courts should recognize that compel-
ling witness testimony converts them into agents of foreign govern-
ments. When these are the circumstances, denying United States citi-
zens their Fifth Amendment rights encourages abuses of power that 
the Bill of Rights sought to enjoin. 
As the nations of the world become more co-dependant, the pos-
sibility of foreign prosecution increases and the possibility of the 
United States abusing an individual’s rights because the prosecution 
is “foreign” increases. When a United States court knows that the 
information compelled from a witness will be used against him in a 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. “In 1996, the SEC made 230 requests for assistance to foreign regulators and re-
ceived, in return, approximately 340 requests from abroad. In 1999, the SEC made 338 re-
quests to foreign regulators and responded to 550 requests from abroad.” Id. 
 188. The MOU between the SEC and the German Bundesaufsichtsamt calls for the par-
ties “to (a) provide access to information in the files of the requested country, (b) take state-
ments of persons, (c) obtain information and documents from persons, and (d) conduct com-
pliance inspections or examinations of investment businesses, securities processing businesses, 
and securities markets.” Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See generally United Nations International Law Commission: Report of the Working 
Group on a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, 33. I.L.M. 253 (1994) (discuss-
ing the jurisdiction, format, and procedures of the International Criminal Court). 
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foreign prosecution, Balsys suggests that at that point the United 
States has become an agent of the foreign court and the Fifth 
Amendment should apply. When United States courts can no longer 
claim ignorance that testimony compelled from United States citi-
zens in United States courts is used in foreign prosecutions, Balsys 
should be overturned. As the United States increasingly cooperates 
with foreign countries in investigating and prosecuting crimes, the 
ability of courts to ignore the rights of United States citizens to Fifth 
Amendment self-incrimination protection will decrease. The Balsys 
court recognized that in the future the United States might be acting 
as the agent of a foreign country. As In re Impounded shows, that fu-
ture is probably closer than the Supreme Court expected. 
V. CONCLUSION 
If the Constitution cannot protect United States citizens from 
being forced to give testimony in United States courts subjecting 
that person to foreign prosecution, what other Constitutional rights 
will courts require United States citizens forego because of interna-
tionalization? Can police ignore other rights against illegal searches 
and seizures because only foreign governments will use the evidence 
collected by them? The logical extension of the same-sovereign ar-
gument used by the Balsys court could justify unconstitutional ac-
tions by United States agents on United States citizens because the 
ultimate user of the information is not the United States government 
but some other nation. That such abuses cannot be allowed should 
be self-evident. Balsys sowed the seeds for its own destruction by de-
scribing the conditions for its overthrow. Many people disagree with 
the outcome of Balsys.191 In re Impounded shows that more chal-
lenges will come to attack the Balsys decision and to argue that there 
should be Fifth Amendment protection for all United States citizens, 
even if they face foreign prosecution. Decided just ten months after 
the Balsys decision, the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Impounded 
shows that circumstances have not yet ripened enough for “another 
day” to dawn. However, it is inevitable that the time will come. 
 
 191. See generally Amann, supra note 165; The Supreme Court, 1997 Term—Leading 
Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 122, 172 (1998); Winger, supra note 49; Leahy, supra note 177; 
Erin Kelly Regan, Comment, United States v. Balsys: Denying a Suspected War Criminal the 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 589 (1999); but see Osterlund, 
supra note 147. 
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The Balsys Court left open the possibility that a witness fearing 
foreign prosecution could invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege of 
silence. That situation will exist when witnesses can show that the 
law of the foreign country was substantially similar to United States 
criminal law, that the witness has a real and substantial fear of prose-
cution, and that the testimony sought for will be used by that for-
eign government. With the United States signing more and more 
MLATS and with the increasing internationalization of criminal 
prosecutions, the time will soon be ripe for a change. Despite the In 
re Impounded holding, other challenges will come attacking Balsys 
and requesting courts to hold that the Constitution protects wit-
nesses fearing foreign prosecution who meet the Balsys exception 
test. Justice Souter wrote the exception test to be applied on “an-
other day.”192 “Another day” is closer than many might think. 
R. Christopher Preston 
 
 
 192. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 699 (1998). 
